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Arizona and Anti-Reform
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulost
The Supreme Court is on the cusp of rejecting one of the
best ideas for reforming American elections: independent
commissions for congressional redistricting. According to the
plaintiffs in a pending case, a commission is not "the
Legislature" of a state. And under the Elections Clause, it is
only "the Legislature" that may set congressional
district boundaries.
There are good reasons, grounded in text and precedent, for
the Court to rebuff this challenge. And these reasons are being
aired effectively in the case's briefing. In this symposium
contribution, then, I develop three other kinds of arguments for
redistricting commissions. Together, they illuminate the high
theoretical, empirical, and policy stakes of this debate.
First, commissions are supported by the political process
theory that underlies many Court decisions. Process theory
contends that judicial intervention is most justified when the
political process has broken down in some way.
Gerrymandering, of course, is a quintessential case of
democratic breakdown. The Court itself thus could (and should)
begin policing gerrymanders. And the Court should welcome the
transfer of redistricting authority from the elected branches to
commissions. Then the risk of breakdown declines without the
Court even needing to enter this particular thicket.
Second, commission usage leads to demonstrable
improvements in key democratic values. The existing literature
links commissions to greater partisan fairness, higher
competitiveness, and better representation. And in a rigorous
Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful
to Eric McGhee, Nathaniel Persily, Richard Pildes, and the participants in The
University of Chicago Legal Forum's wonderful symposium for their helpful comments. I
am pleased as well to acknowledge the support of the Robert Helman Law and Public
Policy Fund.
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new study, spanning federal and state elections over the last
forty years, I find that commissions, courts, and divided
governments all increase partisan fairness relative to unified
governments. At the federal level, in particular, commissions
increase partisan fairness by up to fifty percent.
And third, the implications of the plaintiffs' position are
more sweeping than even they may realize. If only "the
Legislature" may draw congressional district lines, then
governors should not be able to veto plans, nor should state
courts be able to assess their legality. And beyond redistricting,
intrusions into any other aspect of federal elections by
governors, courts, agencies, or voters should be invalid as well.
In short, a victory for the plaintiffs could amount to an
unnecessary election law revolution.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
After I finished writing this Article-but prior to the piece's
publication-the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission.' As I had hoped it would, the Court held that the
Elections Clause does not bar states from transferring authority
over congressional redistricting to independent commissions. 2
And as I expected, the Court's reasoning focused on textual and
precedential arguments. The theoretical, empirical, and
pragmatic points I make here therefore remain relevant even in
the wake of the Court's decision. They provide additional
support for the constitutionality and advisability of
redistricting commissions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of gerrymandering is not ultimately a hard
one. Just take away the legislature's power to design districts,
and transfer it to a properly designed commission. Then self-
interest is removed from the line drawing, and the commission
can set boundaries based on criteria that are not (intentionally)
biased in any party or candidate's favor.3 This reasoning
1 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
2 See id. at 2671 ("[W]e hold that the Elections Clause permits the people of
Arizona to provide for redistricting by independent commission.").
For a fully developed argument in favor of redistricting commissions, see Nicholas
478 [ 2015
ARIZONA AND ANTI-REFORM
explains why thirteen states have switched to commission
control over redistricting-including, most recently, behemoths
like California and New York. 4 It also explains why just about
every foreign country that uses single-member districts has
entrusted their crafting to a commission.5
The Supreme Court, though, has agreed to hear a case that
may turn this logic on its head. The case, Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,6
stems from Arizona voters' decision, in a 2000 initiative, to
establish a commission with final say over redistricting.7 The
Arizona legislature now claims that the commission is
unconstitutional under the Elections Clause. This provision
states that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner" of federal elections
"shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof."8
The commission, obviously enough, is not the legislature. Thus,
the argument goes, the commission's power over redistricting
violates the Constitution's exclusive grant of electoral authority
to the legislature.
There are good textual and precedential reasons to reject
this challenge. As a textual matter, a phrase as procedural as
"Times, Places and Manner" may not cover an activity as
substantive as redistricting.9 The Clause also may use
"Legislature" as shorthand for a state's entire lawmaking
process, including whatever institutions are specified by the
state's constitution. 0 And as a matter of precedent, the Supreme
Court twice has allowed entities other than the legislature to
play a role in congressional redistricting. In 1916, the Court
upheld an Ohio referendum in which voters turned down a
0. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 795-806
(2013).
See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 187-88 (2009)
[hereinafter NCSL REPORT]. Since the publication of this report, New York also has
switched to commission control. See New York State Unofficial Election Night Results,
N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELEC., available at http://nyenr.elections.state.ny.us/home.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/CY6X-KNSZ (showing victory of Proposition 1 in statewide
vote).
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 780-86 (describing institutions used in
redistricting abroad).
The lower court's decision is at 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014).
See id. at 1048-49.
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district plan passed by the legislature." And in 1932, the Court
validated a Minnesota governor's veto of a legislatively
enacted plan.1 2
In this Article, though, I do not stress text and precedent-
considerations at the heart of the case's briefing. Instead, my
focus is on the theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic arguments
for redistricting commissions. These arguments often are
overlooked by lawyers (and judges) more comfortable with
conventional modes of constitutional reasoning. But, in my view,
they are essential to the legal case for commissions. They
explain why commissions should be valued in a democracy, and
also what their benefits actually are.
The theoretical foundation for commissions is political
process theory. Originating in the famous fourth footnote of
Carolene Products,13 and finding its most influential exposition
in the work of John Hart Ely,14 it contends that courts should
strike down laws only when the political process has broken
down in some way. Gerrymandering, of course, is a
quintessential example of democratic breakdown. When
politicians gerrymander, they pursue their own advantage
rather than the public interest, and they distort the conversion
of public opinion into legislative power. Courts thus would be
entitled to review district plans rigorously to ensure that they
are not gerrymanders.15 But it is even better, from the theory's
perspective, if commissions enact the plans in the first place.
Then the risk of gerrymandering is eliminated ex ante rather
than policed ex post. And courts are able to avoid the difficult
(and politically fraught) question of whether gerrymandering in
fact has occurred.
Conversely, it would amount to a wholesale repudiation of
process theory if the Court were to rule in favor of the Arizona
legislature. It would mean that the body that can be trusted
" See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1916).
1 See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-69 (1932).
13 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
14 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
15 In earlier work, I have proposed tests that courts could use to review district
plans. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 884-98 (2015) (proposing test based on
magnitude of plan's efficiency gap); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the
Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1428-42 (2012) (proposing test based on
districts' congruence with geographic communities).
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least to redistrict fairly is the only body that can be responsible
for the activity. It would mean that the fox must be returned to
the henhouse even after voters have chosen to kick it out.
Process theory, it is true, is only one of several interpretive
approaches that guide the Court's constitutional decisions. But
it is hard to see what would be left of it if the Arizona legislature
were to prevail here.
Shifting from theory to empirics, the existing literature has
reached largely (though not entirely) positive conclusions about
commissions' implications for key democratic values. Partisan
fairness is higher in states that use commissions-and even
higher in foreign countries whose commissions are more
insulated and technocratic. Competitiveness follows the same
pattern, rising as jurisdictions adopt better designed
commissions. And representation, in the sense of congruence
with the preferences of the median voter, is better in states
possessing commissions than in states lacking them.
Unfortunately, none of the existing studies of partisan
fairness have controlled sufficiently for state-specific factors and
time trends, or considered enough elections and electoral levels.
I therefore carry out a new empirical analysis of how
commission usage is related to the efficiency gap, a measure of
partisan gerrymandering that I have introduced in previous
work with Eric McGhee. 16 This analysis covers elections over the
entire modern redistricting era (1972 to 2012), at both the
congressional and state house levels. It also considers the full
range of institutions that may be responsible for redistricting:
commissions, courts, and divided or unified state governments.
And it includes fixed effects for states and years, giving rise to a
full difference-in-differences design that allows judgments about
causality to be made.
I find, first, that commissions have not helped much at the
state house level. While commission-drawn plans feature lower
efficiency gaps than plans drawn by other actors, these benefits
evaporate once controls for states and years are added. However,
plans enacted by courts, which also are appealing bodies from a
process theory standpoint, are linked to a statistically
significant improvement in partisan fairness. So too are plans
16 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 840-67.
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passed by divided state governments, which have no incentive to
try to favor a particular party.
At the congressional level, my results vary somewhat based
on whether I calculate plans' efficiency gaps using congressional
or presidential election results. Using congressional data, the
presence of divided government improves partisan fairness, and
neither commission nor court usage attains statistical
significance. But using presidential data (which arguably is
better suited to the task), the presence of divided government
again improves partisan fairness, and commission usage is tied
to a statistically significant and substantively large reduction in
the efficiency gap. Specifically, it produces a 6% reduction,
which represents about half of the 12% gap of the median plan.
These findings bolster the case for congressional
redistricting commissions (the only kind at issue in the pending
litigation). Not only does process theory predict that these
commissions should be less prone to gerrymandering than
legislatures, but its prediction is borne out by a thorough
empirical examination. But what happens if the Court ignores
these arguments? If the Arizona legislature wins, what then?
An obvious consequence is that all commissions with
responsibility for congressional redistricting may be
unconstitutional. Such commissions now exist in eleven states,
and all of them may have to be discarded since they are non-
legislative bodies with authority over federal elections.17 But
this is just the beginning of the potential ramifications. If only
the legislature may be involved in redistricting, then it may be
impermissible for a governor to veto a legislative plan, or for a
state court to assess its validity. Governors and state courts also
may need to be excluded from all other aspects of federal
elections: franchise access, party primaries, campaign finance,
minority representation, and so on. Voter initiatives that touch
on these areas may be unlawful as well. If the Elections Clause
really means that the legislature is the only state actor that may
regulate federal elections, much of modern election law may
be void.
On the other hand, commissions responsible for state
legislative redistricting would be unscathed by an adverse
" See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 169-71. This report does not list California or
New York's commissions because they were adopted after its publication, or Iowa's
because it must be approved by the state legislature before taking effect.
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decision. The Clause applies only to federal elections, and so is
irrelevant to how states choose to design districts for their own
legislatures. In addition, Congress would remain free to
authorize (or even compel) the use of commissions for
congressional redistricting. The Clause's second half states that
Congress "may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations."18 Congress could invoke this power to mandate
commissions, or to adjust any other aspect of federal elections.
Indeed, an adverse decision might boost the odds of federal
intervention by frustrating the states' own efforts at
experimentation. If reform can come only from Washington,
pressure might build for Washington to act.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I briefly
summarize the Arizona case and the key arguments from text
and precedent. In Part III, I explain why process theory
supports states' use of commissions and opposes redistricting by
legislatures. In Part IV, I describe the existing literature on
commissions' implications for partisan fairness, competitiveness,
and representation. In Part V, I conduct my own empirical
analysis of commissions' impact on the size of the efficiency gap.
And in Part IV, I comment on what developments may follow
from a decision by the Court in favor of the Arizona legislature.
II. THE ARIZONA CASE
For almost a century after statehood, Arizona redrew its
state legislative and congressional districts like most states. The
legislature passed ordinary statutes, and the governor then
signed them into law. In 2000, though, Arizona voters approved
Proposition 106 by a margin of 56% to 44%.19 Proposition 106
withdrew the elected branches' authority over redistricting, and
transferred it to an independent commission.20
1s U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4.
1s See State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE (Nov. 7, 2000),
available at http: lapps.azsos.gov/election/2000/General/Canvass2000GE.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/LB7P-WK32. For a discussion of why Proposition 106 succeeded, while
most redistricting initiatives fail, see Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting:
Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L.
& POL. 331, 368-71 (2007).
20 See ARIZ. CONST., art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3) ("[An independent redistricting commission
shall be established to provide for the redistricting of congressional and state legislative
districts.").
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The commission is staffed as follows: First, a different
commission responsible for appellate court appointments selects
a pool of twenty-five candidates, including ten each from the two
major parties and five independents. 21 Second, the majority and
minority leaders of the Arizona House and Senate each appoint
one commissioner. 22 And third, these four commissioners choose
an independent from the pool to serve as the body's chair and
tie-breaking vote.23 The commission then crafts districts based
on the following criteria: (1) compliance with federal law; (2)
equal population; (3) compactness and contiguity; (4) respect for
communities of interest; (5) respect for political subdivisions;
and (6) competitiveness. 24 The commission's plans go into force
without the need for any further action by the
elected branches. 25
In the 2000 cycle, the commission's maps generated a
substantial volume of litigation.26 But none of these lawsuits,
which spanned issues from equal population to the Voting
Rights Act to the competitiveness criterion, alleged that the
commission itself was unconstitutional. 2 7 This claim was not
made until the current cycle, during which the displeasure of the
Republican-dominated state government with the commission's
work reached new heights. Republican leaders' main objection
seems to be that the commission's congressional map is not as
favorable to Republican candidates as it could be. 28 The map
features four heavily Republican districts, two heavily
Democratic districts, and three highly competitive districts.
21 See id. § 1(5).
22 See id. § 1(6).
23 See id. § 1(8) (also noting that if commissioners cannot agree on a chair, she will
be selected by commission on appellate court appointments).
24 See ARiz. CONST., art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(14).
25 See id. § 1(17).
26 See, e.g., Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redist. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 366
F. Supp. 2d 887 (D. Ariz. 2005); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 998 (D. Ariz. 2002); Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redist. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist.
Comm'n, 208 P.3d 676 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
27 See id.
2 See, e.g., District Redrawing Politically Charged, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2011,
at B1 ("Republicans are distrustful of the commission, and ... believe the process is
rigged to give Democrats the upper hand."); New Map May Alter Races for Congress,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 2011, at A2 ("Republicans. . . are concerned that some of their
incumbents generally have gotten a raw deal.").
484 [ 2015
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Democrats won the three tossup districts in 2012, giving them a
five-to-four advantage despite receiving fewer votes statewide. 29
Republican legislators first struck at the commission by
voting to oust its chair for "gross misconduct." 30 However, this
maneuver was thwarted by the Arizona Supreme Court, which
held that a valid basis for removing the chair did not exist. 3 1 On
a party line vote, Republicans next decided to challenge the
commission's constitutionality.3 2 The lawsuit they authorized
was dismissed by a three-judge district court,33 but now is slated
for argument before the U.S. Supreme Court.34
The legislature's position, as detailed in its brief to the
Court, is straightforward. In its view, the Elections Clause
delegates power over congressional elections to it, and to it
alone.35 "Legislature" unambiguously means the state's
representative lawmaking body, and does not encompass any
other institution or process. 36 It thus violates the Clause for a
non-legislative entity like the commission to be involved in
redistricting, and for the legislature itself to be excluded.37
"[W]hile the [commission] is plainly not the Legislature and is
structured to look and operate nothing like the Legislature, the
29 See Election Adds to Debate Over Redistricting, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 2012, at
Al; State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2012), available at
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2012/PPE/canvass20l2ppe.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
6L9K-AWBT. In 2014, Republicans won a five-to-four majority after prevailing in a
recount in one of the tossup districts. See Arizona's Vote Count Once Again Hits Snags,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 2014, at Al; State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIz. SEC'Y OF
STATE (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2014/Generall
Canvass2014GE.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccfl'8U8-QUP3.
30 See Redistricting Chief Ousted, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 2011, at Al.
3' See Redistrict Chief Reinstated, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 2011, at Al.
32 See Legislature Challenges Redistrict Commission, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 8, 2012,
at Bl.
3 See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D.
Ariz. 2014).
3' See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
35 See Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist.
Comm'n, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Ariz. Legis. Brief] ("The plain text
of this provision clearly delegates the authority ... to one entity alone: 'the Legislature'
of a State."); Brief for Appellees at 33, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n,
No. 13-1314 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing "narrow definition of 'Legislature' that
Appellant proposes, namely that the term refers exclusively to a body of elected
representatives").
36 See Ariz. Legis. Brief, supra note 35, at 24-31.
' See id. at 36-42.
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actual Legislature has been cut out of the redistricting
process entirely ....
One textual response is that "Legislature" reasonably may
be read to denote a state's lawmaking process in its entirety,
including whatever methods are identified by the state's
constitution. As the district court in the Arizona case put it, "the
word 'Legislature' in the Elections Clause refers to the
legislative process used in that state, determined by that state's
own constitution and laws." 3 9 Under this reading, there was
nothing wrong with Proposition 106's transfer of cartographic
power from the legislature to the commission, because voter
initiatives like Proposition 106 are authorized explicitly by the
Arizona Constitution. 40
Another textual retort is that "Times, Places and Manner"
plausibly may be construed as extending only to procedural
issues-and not to an activity with as many substantive
consequences for candidates and parties as redistricting.41 The
Court has long interpreted the Elections Clause as "a grant of
authority to issue procedural regulations, and not a source of
power to dictate electoral outcomes." 42 Since the power to shape
districts is, above all, the power to dictate outcomes, it may be
impermissible for legislatures to redistrict on the basis of
political considerations. At the very least, under this reading, it
would be acceptable for a non-legislative body to draw district
lines based on nonpartisan criteria. Indeed, such a redistricting
process might be affirmatively compelled by the Clause.43
As a matter of precedent as well, a trio of cases have made
clear that entities other than the legislature may play a role in
congressional redistricting. In the 1916 case of Ohio ex rel. Davis
v. Hildebrant,44 the Court upheld an Ohio referendum in which
3 Id. at 37-38.
3 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1054 (D.
Ariz. 2014); see also Brown v. Sec'y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he
term 'Legislature' in the Elections Clause refers not just to a state's legislative body but
more broadly to the entire lawmaking process of the state.").
40 See Ariz. State Legis., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55 ("The Arizona Constitution
allows multiple avenues for lawmaking and one of those avenues is the ballot initiative,
as employed here through Proposition 106.").
41 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4.
42 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995).
4 For a longer argument along these lines, see Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution
and Political Competition, 30 NoVA L. REV. 253, 263-67 (2006).
44 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
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voters rejected a district plan passed by the legislature. It did
not matter that voters are distinct from the legislature, because
"the referendum constituted a part of the state Constitution and
laws, and was contained within the legislative power." 45
Similarly, in the 1932 case of Smiley v. Holm,46 the Court
sustained a Minnesota governor's veto of a legislatively enacted
map. Again, the governor's involvement was unobjectionable
because it was "in accordance with the method which the state
has prescribed for legislative enactments." 47
Lastly, in the 2014 case of Brown v. Secretary of State,48 the
Eleventh Circuit validated a Florida voter initiative that
required the legislature to comply with an array of redistricting
criteria. Once more, it was immaterial that an initiative is
something other than the legislature, because "the lawmaking
power in Florida expressly includes the power of the people to
amend their constitution, and that is exactly what the people did
here."49 Brown probably is the precedent most applicable to the
Arizona case, since it also concerned a redistricting initiative. If
the Florida amendment did not violate the Elections Clause, it is
hard to see how Proposition 106 could do so.
Much more could be said, of course, about the textual and
precedential arguments for and against each side. (And much
more has been said in the case's briefing.) But my interest here
is not in reiterating these relatively conventional points.
Instead, I wish to focus on the theoretical, empirical, and
pragmatic aspects of the debate-aspects that the briefing
mostly has missed. In the next Part, then, I assess redistricting
commissions from the perspective of political process theory. In
short, the theory strongly favors them because they mitigate the
high risk of democratic malfunction associated with
legislative redistricting.
III. THE PROCESS THEORY PERSPECTIVE
The core claim of process theory is that courts are most
justified in striking down laws that emerge from a flawed
45 Id. at 567.
6 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
1 Id. at 367.
48 668 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2014).
" Id. at 1279.
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political process. In this context, courts avoid the
countermajoritarian difficulty because their intervention
promotes democracy instead of frustrating it. Process theory has
its roots in United States v. Carolene Products' legendary fourth
footnote, which identified two kinds of process defects
warranting "more exacting judicial scrutiny."50 The first is
"legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation"-that is, policies making it more likely that the
majority's preferences will be thwarted.51 The second is
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," which may
"curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities."52
Two generations after Carolene Products, John Hart Ely
refashioned its dicta into perhaps the most celebrated theory of
judicial review of all time. He agreed with the Court that
"unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about." 53 He also restated the
process defects that justify judicial intervention as follows: "(1)
the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) ...
representatives ... are systematically disadvantaging some
minority out of simple hostility." 54 While not without its critics,55
Ely's theory is widely viewed as explaining much of the Court's
activity during the second half of the twentieth century.56 And
its appeal remains undimmed today; as David Strauss has
quipped, "If you have a better idea about what courts should be
doing in difficult constitutional cases, let me know."5 7
5o United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
s Id.
52 Id. For an article-length treatment of the second kind of process defect, see
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 114 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015).
5 ELY, supra note 14, at 117.
54 Id. at 103.
5 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge
of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037
(1980).
5 See David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1259 ("Carolene Products was the theory of the Supreme Court of the United States
under Earl Warren.").
- Id. at 1269.
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Legislative redistricting is troubling from a process theory
standpoint, then, because it often produces the first kind of
process defect.5 8 It often makes it harder for the majority's
preferences to be realized, and easier for the ins to benefit at the
expense of the outs. How can lines on a map have such dramatic
effects? The answer, of course, is that lines determine how votes
are aggregated, and so which candidate wins or loses in each
district. One district configuration helps (or harms) one set of
candidates; another configuration helps (or harms) another set. 5 9
And why are legislators prone to exploiting the
opportunities presented by redistricting? For the obvious
reasons of self-interest and partisan advantage. Legislators
want to keep their jobs, and so want to make their districts safe
enough that they face no serious challenge. Legislators also
would like for their party to be as powerful as possible, which
entails "packing" the opposition in a few districts that it wins by
overwhelming margins, or "cracking" it across numerous
districts that it narrowly loses.60 When the aim of protecting
incumbents takes priority over other factors, a plan is called a
bipartisan gerrymander.6 1 When the goal of helping one party
(and harming its adversary) predominates, a plan is deemed a
partisan gerrymander. Either way, a democratic malfunction
has occurred, since boundaries have been set for the sake of
distorting the translation of voters' preferences into
legislative seats.
This discussion suggests that courts should review
legislatively enacted plans rigorously to ensure that they are not
gerrymanders (of either type). After all, gerrymandering is an
archetypal case of a process defect that should be redressed
through judicial intervention. This conclusion is correct, in my
view, and it is why elsewhere I have proposed tests that courts
could use to distinguish valid from invalid plans. 62
s For longer arguments along these lines, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at
795-806; Stephanopoulos, supra note 19, at 334-42.
* See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("District lines are rarely
neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly
Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely.").
6 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 851-52 (explaining techniques
of packing and cracking).
6' For more on the harms of bipartisan gerrymanders, see Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593 (2002).
62 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15 at 884-98 (proposing test based on
magnitude of plan's efficiency gap); Stephanopoulos, supra note 15, at 1428-42
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But it is even better, from the perspective of process theory,
if commissions design maps in the first place than if courts
scrutinize them after the fact. This is so for two reasons. First,
courts are unlikely to catch all (or even most) gerrymanders.
Gerrymanders are notoriously difficult to identify-so difficult,
in fact, that courts essentially have turned the cause of action
for partisan gerrymandering into a dead letter.63 Reliance on
judicial policing thus means that many process defects would go
uncorrected. In contrast, properly structured commissions
prevent the defects from arising at all. One cause of
gerrymandering, legislators' self-interest, is absent as long as
commissions are staffed by non-legislators. The other cause,
partisan advantage, does not apply either if commissioners are
divided evenly between the parties or (even better) are
nonpartisan technocrats. In short, courts can only fix a
democratic malfunction ex post, while commissions can avoid it
ex ante.
Second, commission-crafted plans reduce the need for
judicial involvement. 64 A perennial worry of process theory is
that courts may strike down laws for reasons other than a
process breakdown, such as the imposition of their substantive
values.65 This risk is present as long as courts are the main line
of defense against gerrymandering. They may invalidate plans
not because they shield incumbents or benefit a particular party,
but rather because they offend the judicial sensibility in some
other way. 6 6 But the danger diminishes if commissions draw
maps that are then reviewed deferentially by courts. In this
case, there is less opportunity for judicial activity unjustified by
process theory, because there is less judicial activity to
begin with.
A skeptic might respond that commissions are not immune
from the forces that render legislatures vulnerable to process
(proposing test based on districts' congruence with geographic communities).
6 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 839-41 (noting that plaintiffs
have lost every partisan gerrymandering challenge in last generation).
6 For a similar argument, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 797.
65 See ELY, supra note 14, at 73 (fretting about "value imposition" by a Court that
has become "a council of legislative revision").
6 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432-34
(2006) (striking down district because it combined overly dissimilar Hispanic
populations); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-58 (1993) (striking down district because
of racial message it allegedly conveyed).
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failures.67 Staff a commission with politicians, especially with
more of one party's stalwarts than the other's,68 and it will enact
a gerrymander as reliably as a legislature. There is nothing
magical about the commission form. This is true enough, but its
implication is not that commissions in fact are undesirable
according to process theory. Rather, it means that care must be
taken to structure the bodies so that they do not redistrict on the
basis of improper considerations. And care often is taken. Most
American commissions are bipartisan, with equal representation
for each party,69 while most foreign commissions are
nonpartisan, manned by geographers, statisticians, and the
like.70 Thanks to these staffing choices, many of the latter bodies
enjoy sterling reputations for independence and impartiality.71
A skeptic also might grumble that the case for commissions
is strong in theory, but uncertain in practice. What is the
evidence, the skeptic might ask, that commissions in fact draw
better maps than legislatures? This charge can be answered only
with data. In the next Part, then, I summarize the existing
literature on commissions' effects on partisan fairness,
competitiveness, and representation. And in the following Part, I
carry out my own analysis of how commission usage is related to
the size of the efficiency gap. Together, these Parts show that
the case for commissions is empirically persuasive as well. A
Court decision in favor of the Arizona legislature thus would be
regrettable from the vantage of not just process theory, but also
substantive outcomes.
IV. EXISTING LITERATURE
Beginning with partisan fairness, there are two metrics that
political scientists use to evaluate district plans. The first is
6 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative
Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 73 (1985);
Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Hen Houses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REV. 649, 674 (2002).
68 Several states do precisely this. See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 189-200
(describing unbalanced politician commissions used in Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas).
69 See id. (describing bipartisan commissions used in Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington).
70 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 780-86 (describing foreign redistricting
commissions).
n See id. at 802.
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partisan bias, that is, the divergence in the share of seats that
each party would win given the same share of the statewide
vote. 72 For example, if Democrats would win 45% of the seats
with 50% of the vote (in which case Republicans would win 55%
of the seats), then a plan would have a pro-Republican bias of
5%. The second is the efficiency gap, that is, the difference
between the parties' respective wasted votes in an election,
divided by the total number of votes cast. 73 Votes are "wasted" if
they are cast for a losing candidate, or for a winning candidate
but in excess of what she needed to prevail. So if Democrats
wasted 200 votes, Republicans wasted 300 votes, and 1000 votes
were cast in an election, then a plan would have a pro-
Democratic gap of 10% ((300-200)/1000).
With respect to American elections, three studies have
examined how partisan fairness varies by the identity of the
redistricting authority. First, Bruce Cain and others calculated
the partisan biases of fifty legislative chambers in twenty-six
states using the results of the 2002 elections. 74 The average bias
was 4.0% in states with commissions, compared to 11.7% in
states where legislatures drew the lines.75 Second, Vladimir
Kogan and Eric McGhee focused on California's experience after
it adopted a commission for the 2010 cycle. 76 For all three maps
that the commission enacted, partisan bias dropped from about
5% to almost zero.77 And third, in a study of redistricting criteria
covering the 1992-2012 period, I found that commissions reduce
the efficiency gap in state legislative elections, but have no
statistically significant impact in congressional elections.78 I also
72 See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 545 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The
Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After
LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007).
7 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 850-55 (explaining computation
and key properties of efficiency gap).
74 See Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State
Legislative Elections *12 (Apr 13, 2007) (on file with author).
' These calculations are on file with the author. See also id. at 13 (finding that bias
decreased in all nine states that used bipartisan commissions in 2000 cycle).
76 See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of
the Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y 1 (2012).
7 See id. at 22-24 (presenting seat-vote curves showing these results).
78 See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 710-11 (2013) (also finding that commissions do not
significantly affect partisan bias at either level).
492 [ 2015
ARIZONA AND ANTI-REFORM
found that courts improve partisan fairness in both state
legislative and congressional elections.7 9
Three more studies have scrutinized the record of foreign
commissions. Simon Jackman determined that two Australian
states, South Australia and Queensland, experienced dramatic
drops in partisan bias after instituting commissions,
respectively, in 1975 and 1992.80 Similarly, Alan Siaroff showed
that bias in Quebec fell almost in half after the province adopted
a commission in 1972.81 And in my study of redistricting criteria,
I found that partisan bias and the efficiency gap both are about
one-third lower in Australian district plans (all of which now are
devised by commissions) than in American plans.8 2 These
foreign analyses confirm the mostly encouraging picture painted
by the more rigorous U.S. work.
Next, political scientists assess competitiveness using
several different metrics. Some are fairly self-explanatory, such
as the average margin of victory and the share of districts won
by less than some threshold (typically ten or twenty points). 83
But electoral responsiveness may be less clear; it refers to the
rate at which a party gains or loses seats given changes in its
statewide vote share.84 For instance, if Democrats would win
10% more seats if they received 5% more of the vote, then a plan
would have a responsiveness of 2.0.
With respect to the more familiar metrics, Cain et al. found
that, in 2002, districts drawn by commissions were more likely
to be contested, and to be decided by less than ten points, than
districts drawn by legislatures.8 5 Likewise, Jamie Carson and
Michael Crespin concluded that commissions had a positive
impact on the share of districts won by less than twenty points
in the 1992 and 2002 congressional elections, even controlling
7 See id. (showing that courts have statistically significant impact in three of four
models).
8 See Simon Jackman, Measuring Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949-93, 24 BRIT. J.
POL. Scl. 319, 344-45 (1994).
8' See Alan Siaroff, Electoral Bias in Quebec Since 1936, 4 CAN. POL. Sci. REV. 62,
66-67 (2010) (using slightly different method to calculate bias).
82 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 78, at 704.
8 See id. at 685 (discussing these metrics).
84 See Gelman & King, supra note 72, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 72,
at 9.
as See Cain et al., supra note 74, at 16.
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for a range of other variables.86 And in my study of redistricting
criteria, I determined that commissions reduced the average
margin of victory and increased the share of districts won by less
than twenty points in congressional elections from 1992 to 2012,
again controlling for other relevant factors.87 I also found that
courts improved competitiveness in state legislative elections,88
and that plans enacted by Australian commissions generally are
more competitive than their American analogues. 89
However, commissions did not have a statistically
significant impact on incumbent vote share in congressional
races between 1982 and 2008, according to a study by James
Cottrill.90 (Though they did make these races more likely to be
contested by experienced challengers.91 ) Commissions also may
have reduced the probability of state legislative races being won
by less than ten points in 2002, according to a study by Seth
Masket and others. 92 (Though, again, commissions were
associated with lower rates of uncontested elections from 2000
to 2008.93)
With respect to responsiveness, Cain et al. found that, in
2002, commissions' plans had an average score of 1.45,
compared to 0.88 for legislatures' maps.94 Similarly, Jackman
determined that, of the ten Australian plans with the lowest
responsiveness scores from 1949 to 1993, eight were in a pair of
states (South Australia and Western Australia) that lacked
commissions at the time. 95 And in my study of redistricting
criteria, I concluded that commissions improved responsiveness
86 See Jamie L. Carson & Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting
Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House of Representatives Races, 4
STATE POL. & POL'Y Q. 455, 461-62 (2004).
87 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 78, at 712-15. However, commissions did not
have a statistically significant impact on competitiveness in state legislative elections.
8 See id. However, courts did not have a statistically significant impact on
competitiveness in congressional elections.
89 See id. at 704.
9o See James B. Cottrill, The Effects of Non-Legislative Approaches to Redistricting
on Competition in Congressional Elections, 44 POLITY 32, 45 (2012).
91 See id. at 48.
92 See Seth E. Masket et al., The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative
Redistricting Won't Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It, 45
POL. ScI. & POL. 39, 41 (2012).
9 See id. at 42.
' See Cain et al., supra note 74, at 12. These calculations are on file with the
author.
98 See Jackman, supra note 80, at 350.
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in congressional elections over the 1992-2012 period, while
courts improved responsiveness in state legislative elections.96 I
also showed that plans enacted by Australian commissions are
nearly twice as responsive as American maps (about 2.8 versus
about 1.5).9
Lastly, Eric McGhee, Steven Rogers, and I recently explored
how different electoral reforms (including commissions) are
related to representation.9 8 We conceived of representation as the
ideological distance between the median voter in a state and the
median member of the state's legislature. 99 We used presidential
election results to estimate voters' ideologies, and roll call votes
to estimate legislators' ideologies.100 And our analysis spanned
the 1992-2012 period and included fixed effects for states and
years. 101 We found that commissions are the only redistricting
policy that improves representation.1 0 2 In states where
commissions draw the lines, the median voter and the median
legislator are significantly more proximate than in other states.
In sum, the existing literature largely validates the
predictions of process theory as to commissions. Just as the
theory would expect, these bodies are less likely to produce
democratic malfunctions than legislatures. Their district plans
typically treat the major parties more symmetrically, exhibit
higher levels of competitiveness, and improve voters' actual
representation. To be sure, not all of the studies' findings are
positive, but their overall orientation is indisputable.
Gerrymandering does seem less prevalent when commissions
are responsible for redistricting.
However, the reliability of the existing partisan fairness
studies is relatively low. In contrast to the competitiveness and
representation studies, most of them include no controls
96 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 78, at 712-15. However, commissions did not
have a significant impact on responsiveness in state legislative elections, and courts did
not have a significant impact on responsiveness in congressional elections. See id.
97 See id. at 704.
9 See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68
VAND. L. REV. 761 (2015).
9 See id. at 768-72.
1oo See id. at 789-95.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 796-801. More specifically, commissions improve chamber-level
alignment but worsen it at the district level. As we explain, chamber-level results are
more important for redistricting policies that are intended to have statewide
consequences. See id. at 829-31.
477]1 495
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
whatsoever, and none of them include fixed effects for states and
years. 103 In addition, even the most thorough partisan fairness
study covers only a twenty-year period, or half of the modern
redistricting era. 104 In the next Part, I therefore conduct a new
empirical analysis that rectifies these shortcomings. I examine
state and federal elections from 1972 to 2012, employing a full
difference-in-differences design that enables conclusions about
causality to be reached.
V. PARTISAN FAIRNESS ANALYSIS
The dependent variable in each of my models is the absolute
value of the efficiency gap. I examine the efficiency gap rather
than partisan bias because, as I have argued elsewhere, the
former metric is conceptually superior to the latter. 105 The
efficiency gap is calculated using actual election results, not the
outcomes of a hypothetical election in which the parties receive
equal vote shares. 106 I also consider the absolute rather than the
raw value of the efficiency gap because I am interested here in
the magnitude of gerrymandering, not its orientation. 107 And I
compute the efficiency gap using state legislative and
congressional election results from 1972 to 2012,108 as well as
presidential election results aggregated by congressional district
over the same period. 109 The advantage of endogenous (i.e., state
103 Only my own previous work includes any controls. See Stephanopoulos, supra
note 78, at 709-15.
10 See id. at 690 n. 90, 694 n. 106.
10 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 855-63.
106 See id. at 856. There are other problems with partisan bias as well, such as its
reliance on the uniform swing assumption, its inapplicability to uncompetitive elections,
and the odd results it sometimes produces. See id. at 859-61.
107 I took the same approach in my earlier studies of redistricting criteria, see
Stephanopoulos, supra note 78, at 684-85 (using absolute value of partisan bias and
efficiency gap), and of electoral reforms, see Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 98, at 793
(using absolute value of regression residual).
10s State legislative election results have been compiled by Carl Klarner in a
database he shared with me. Congressional election results are available at Office of the
Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, Election Information: Election Statistics,
available at http: //clerk.house.gov/member info/electionlnfo/index.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/3C44-B5F7, and also, in a more usable format, in a database that Gary
Jacobson shared with me. I only included state legislative plans made up exclusively of
single-member districts (which led to the omission of the Arizona and New Jersey
commissions), and congressional plans that featured at least eight districts at some point
during the 1972-2012 period (which led to the omission of the Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, and Montana commissions).
109 Jacobson's database includes the aggregated presidential data. Unfortunately,
[ 2015496
ARIZONA AND ANTI-REFORM
legislative and congressional) data is that it comes from the very
chambers whose distortion I am studying. The advantage of
exogenous (i.e., presidential) data is that it is unaffected by
candidate quality and the incumbency advantage-and so is
more under the control of the redistricting authority.
For each state-year entry in my database, I coded whether
its district plan was drawn by a commission, a court, or a unified
or divided state government.110 I included bipartisan and
nonpartisan commissions in the commission category; but not
partisan commissions, advisory commissions, or backup
commissions that were not triggered in a given cycle.' In the
court category, I included plans that were largely or entirely
judicially crafted, but not plans to which courts made only minor
adjustments.H2 And I assessed governmental control by
determining which party held the governorship and a majority
in each legislative chamber at the time of redistricting. I also
coded cases as unified government control where a partisan
commission tilted in one party's favor was used. These
institutions are the key independent variables in the models.
The models include fixed effects for states and years too.
These fixed effects mean that any differences among the states
due to politics, economics, demography, culture, and so on are
presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district are unavailable for
the majority of the 1972-2012 period.
n0 By redistricting cycle, my main sources were the following: for the 2010s, Justin
Levitt, All About Redistricting, http://redistricting.ls.edu, for the 2000s, Action on
Redistricting Plans: 2001-07, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Jan. 9, 2008), http://
www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/action2000.htm, ar-
chived at http://perma.ccl4DC2-FB9Y; for the 1990s, Action on Redistricting Plans:
1991-99, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.senate.
leg. state. mn.us/departments/scr/redist/Redsum/Action 1 990.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/23HB-U2XY; for the 1980s, Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party
Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242 (1990),
and 1980s Redistricting Case Summaries, MINN. LEGIS. COORDINATING COMM'N,
available at http: //www.gis.leg.mn/OpenLayers/redistricting/1980/case/index.php,
archived at http://perma.cclA7QL-6MER; and for the 1970s, REAPPORTIONMENT
POLITICS: THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN THE FIFTY STATES (Leroy Hardy et al. eds.,
1981), and Amihai Glazer et al., Partisan and Incumbency Effects of 1970s Congressional
Redistricting, 31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 680 (1987). 1 also obtained data on party control of state
governments from another database assembled by Carl Klarner.
n. For a summary of which states currently use each type of commission, see NCSL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 189-200. I do not include partisan commissions because they
are functionally equivalent to unified party control; advisory commissions because their
recommendations often are ignored by the elected branches; or unused backup
commissions because they play no role in redistricting.
11 This required me to exercise my judgment in certain cases, especially when
legislatively enacted plans were invalidated but then mostly deferred to by courts.
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controlled for, as are any time trends. The coefficient for each
institution thus indicates its impact on the size of the efficiency
gap independent of developments in other states as well as the
state's own prior history. This design capitalizes on the
significant geographic and temporal variation of the
redistricting institutions in my database. It most closely
approaches the social scientific ideal of identifying policies' true
causal effects. 113
At the state legislative level, as displayed in Figure 1's first
panel, the coefficients for commission usage, court usage, and
divided government all are negative, and those for court usage
and divided government both are statistically significant.114 (The
omitted category is unified government.) Court usage and
divided government both result in a decline in the absolute
value of the efficiency gap of roughly 1%. This is a fairly
substantial effect given that the median state legislative plan
has an absolute efficiency gap of about 4%.
At the congressional level and using congressional election
results, as shown in Figure 1's second panel, the coefficients for
commission usage, court usage, and divided government all are
negative, and that for divided government is statistically
significant.115 (The omitted category again is unified
government.) Divided government produces a decline in the
absolute value of the efficiency gap of roughly 2%. This too is a
considerable effect given that the median congressional plan has
an absolute efficiency gap of about 6% (using
congressional data).
Lastly, at the congressional level and using aggregated
presidential election results, as presented in Figure 1's third
panel, the coefficients for commission usage, court usage, and
divided government all are negative, and those for commission
na For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see Eric M.
McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator
Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. Scl. 337, 343 (2014). Fixed effects are more appropriate here
than random effects because the relevant clusters (years and states) are "of intrinsic
interest," and not merely "examples of possible clusters." SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH &
ANDERS SKRONDAL, I MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA 97 (3d ed.
2012). Fixed effects also are a more rigorous test than random effects, and so less likely
to give rise to statistically significant findings.
114 The latter is significant at the 10% level, with a p-value of 0.055. All regression




usage and divided government are statistically significant. 11 6
(Unified government once more is the omitted category.) Divided
government causes a decline in the absolute value of the
efficiency gap of roughly 3%, while commission usage causes a
decline of roughly 6%. The latter figure represents close to half
of the 12% absolute efficiency gap (using presidential data) of
the median congressional plan.
In combination, these results provide strong, though not
overwhelming, support for the predictions of process theory. As
the theory would expect, unified governments are by far the
institutions most likely to engage in partisan gerrymandering.
In every model, the presence of divided government is linked to
a statistically significant (and reasonably large) decrease in the
absolute value of the efficiency gap. Also as the theory would
expect, the record of more neutral institutions is generally
positive. Courts produce a statistically significant drop in the
absolute efficiency gap at the state legislative level, while
commissions do the same (but more dramatically) using
presidential data at the congressional level. The coefficients for
court usage and commission usage are negative in every model
as well. However, they fail to rise to statistical significance in
several cases, thus rendering the overall picture less than
perfectly clear.
Why are courts more effective at the state legislative than
at the congressional level? One possibility is that, in most states,
more redistricting criteria (such as compactness, respect for
political subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest)
apply to state legislative than to congressional districts.117 So
courts typically have more substantive guidance when designing
state legislative districts, which may make it easier for them to
avoid producing plans that are skewed in one party's favor.118
And why are commissions more effective using exogenous rather
than endogenous data? The explanation might be that
n6 See id.
"' See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 125-27.
1s See Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 98, at 772-78 (summarizing literature on
implications of redistricting criteria for partisan fairness). Another explanation for
courts' better record at the state legislative level is that they might be more deferential
to the elected branches' preferences in higher-stakes federal cases. Notably, the Supreme
Court has intervened several times to stop lower courts from exercising too much
discretion when crafting congressional districts. See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934,
944 (2012); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-44 (1982); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,
793-97 (1973).
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idiosyncratic factors like the incumbency advantage and
candidate quality-which influence endogenous but not
exogenous results-often complicate commissions' efforts to
design fair plans. Plans that look balanced according to the
electorate's underlying partisanship thus might seem less
equitable after particular candidates have run their particular
campaigns. Commissions can take into account underlying
partisanship, but not (at least without great difficulty)
candidates' personal peculiarities.' 19
But while there are still puzzles for future work to solve, it
is clear enough that unified government increases the likelihood
of democratic malfunction, while courts and commissions reduce
it. This is a compelling reason for the Court not to rule in favor
of the Arizona legislature. What happens, though, if the Court
does so anyway? What policy consequences would follow for
redistricting specifically and for election law more generally? In
the Article's final Part, I offer some tentative answers.
u1 Cf. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 15, at 868 n. 159, 870 n. 166




- A -% 0% 1
AbsojeEnficiency Gap
Congressional Plans (Congressional Data)
Dmad Game ...
A t ciy2% 0%
4...~f EICMd- Gap
Congressional Plans (Presidential Data)
Con0mssion
Ab0o- efkh4c -2 %
AboUle Efkta,4 Gop
Figure 1: Coefficient Plots for Efficiency Gap Models
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The most obvious implication of a decision in favor of the
Arizona legislature would be that congressional redistricting
commissions in several other states likely would be
unconstitutional too. Such commissions currently are used not
only in Arizona but also in California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, New York, and
Washington. 120 All of these bodies would be on thin legal ice if
the Arizona commission is struck down. All of them plainly are
not the legislature itself, yet exercise authority with respect to
an aspect of federal elections.
120 See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 197-200. This report does not list California's
or New York's commissions because they were adopted after its publication, or Iowa's
because it must be approved by the state legislature before taking effect.
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Some of these bodies, though, would be on thinner ice than
others. California's would be the most clearly unconstitutional,
because its members are chosen by lottery rather than by
legislative appointment. 121 Legislative leaders are permitted
only to veto a number of candidates, not actually to select any of
them.122 In the next group would be the Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, New Jersey, and Washington commissions, all of
which have essentially the same structure as the Arizona
commission. 123 Major party leaders appoint equal numbers of
commissioners, who then (except in Idaho) choose a tie-breaking
chair.124 And the most likely to survive would be the
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, and New York commissions, all of
which retain a larger role for the legislature. The Connecticut
and Indiana bodies are convened only if the legislature fails to
enact a congressional plan. 125 Analogously, the Iowa and New
York bodies only draft advisory maps that the legislature then is
free to accept, revise, or reject.126
But it is not just commissions that might be
unconstitutional if the Arizona legislature prevails. Its claim
that the Elections Clause "delegates [electoral] authority . .. to
one entity alone: 'the Legislature' of a State," implies that
governors and courts should not be involved in redistricting
either.127 The governor's power to veto congressional plans,
which currently exists in forty-eight states, thus might be
void.128 So might be state courts' authority to evaluate
121 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8252(b).
122 See id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat'l Conf. of State Legis. at 14-17, Ariz.
State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2014) (also linking
Arizona and California commissions). Another similarity between the Arizona and
California bodies is that they are the only congressional redistricting commissions to
have been created by voter initiative, without any legislative involvement. This feature
also may distinguish them legally from the other commissions.
123 See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 198-99.
124 See id. The Idaho commission has an even number of commissioners, divided
equally between the two major parties. See id. at 198.
121 See id. at 200.
126 See IOWA CODE § 42.5 (describing Iowa commission); N.Y. Bd. of Elec., Proposed
Ballot Propositions, available at http: #www.elections.ny.gov/ProposedConsAmendments
2.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X87D-XKVK (describing New York commission).
127 Ariz. Legis. Brief, supra note 35, at 23-24.
128 The only exceptions are Connecticut and North Carolina, where the governor
cannot veto congressional plans. See Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT




congressional maps' validity (let alone to draw remedial maps in
the event of their invalidity). 12 9 It would not be hyperbolic to call
these potential developments a second reapportionment
revolution-a sweeping transformation of how congressional
redistricting has been conducted for the past half century.
These developments are only potential ones, though,
because it is possible to imagine a decision that invalidates the
Arizona commission but not governors' and state courts'
functions. In particular, if the Court were to hold that the
Elections Clause bars only the legislature's complete exclusion
from the redistricting process, then various arrangements that
preserve roles for other institutions might be acceptable. 130 Then
governors might be able to keep their vetoes, and state courts
their suits, because the legislature still would get to draft plans
in the first instance. This approach has the advantage of
reducing institutional disruption and avoiding the overruling of
Hildebrant and Smiley. But it has the disadvantage of
inconsistency with the Arizona legislature's core textual
argument. If the power to redistrict belongs to the legislature
alone, then governors and state courts should not be able to
block its plans.
Nor should they be able to intrude into any other aspect of
federal elections. Federal elections, of course, include much more
than just redistricting. They also span areas such as franchise
access, party primaries, campaign finance, and minority
representation. In all of these areas too, the implication of the
Arizona legislature's position is that it should wield exclusive
power. Electoral rules are not set by the legislature alone if
governors and state courts can negate its choices, if voters can
shape policy via initiative, or if state agencies play a role in
regulation.131 The gubernatorial veto, judicial adjudication,
12' Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing
that excessive state court involvement violated state legislature's power to decide how to
allocate presidential electors). Presumably (though not necessarily), it does not violate
the Elections Clause if federal courts ensure that congressional plans do not violate
applicable legal requirements.
130 Cf. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm'n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056-
58 (D. Ariz. 2014) (Rosenblatt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating
something like this position); Ariz. Legis. Brief, supra note 35, at 23 (focusing on
"complete divestment of the Legislature's constitutionally-conferred redistricting power")
(emphasis added).
131 I did not mention state agencies in the abstract in the discussion of redistricting
because commissions are the only common kind of state redistricting agency.
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direct democracy, and agency administration all are forms of
lawmaking distinct from the legislature itself. Accordingly, it is
not just a reapportionment revolution that would ensue if the
Arizona legislature's stance is accepted. The reverberations also
would be felt in every other corner of the electoral landscape.
For a sense of how violent these shocks would be, consider
the many reforms that have been adopted through voter
initiatives. Over the years, voters have restricted the franchise
through photo identification laws, 132 expanded it through right-
to-vote amendments, 133 required parties to hold certain types of
primaries, 134 imposed term limits on officeholders,1 35 enacted
variants of the Voting Rights Act,136 and so on. All of these
policies have extended to federal elections-and all of these
extensions would be unconstitutional according to the Arizona
legislature. Likewise, take the many state officials and agencies
who supervise elections: the Secretary of State in thirty-nine
states,1 37 as well as more specialized bodies like Wisconsin's
Government Accountability Board.1 38 Their ambit also includes
federal elections, and so cannot be reconciled with the Arizona
legislature's claim of exclusive authority in this domain.
Still, it is important not to overstate the consequences of an
adverse decision. For one thing, commissions responsible for
state legislative redistricting will be entirely unaffected. The
Elections Clause applies only to "Elections for [United States]
Senators and Representatives."1 39 It therefore has no bearing on
132 See, e.g., Voter ID History, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 16, 2014), available
at http://www.ncsl.org/researchlelections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx, archived
at http://perma.cc/N726-WG9P (noting that Mississippi adopted photo identification
requirement through voter initiative).
133 See, e.g., Official Canvass, ILL. BD. OF ELEC. (Nov. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/ElectionInformationNoteTotals/2014GEOfficialVo
te.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2ZAC-ZS4B (showing passage of Illinois right-to-vote
amendment).
134 See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Rep. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444 (2008)
(noting that Washington adopted top-two primary through voter initiative).
.3. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783-84 (1995) (noting
that Arkansas adopted term limits through voter initiative).
136 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20-21 (Florida amendments adopted via voter
initiative that include very similar language to Voting Rights Act).
13' See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 976-77 (2005).
138 See Daniel P. Tokaji, America's Top Model: The Wisconsin Government
Accountability Board, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 575 (2013).
13 U.S. CONST., art. I, §4.
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the substantially larger number of commissions that redraw the
maps for states' own legislative chambers. These bodies exist (in
some form) in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. 140 All of them
will be able to continue on their merry way no matter how the
Arizona case is resolved.
The capacity of Congress to regulate federal elections will be
left intact as well. The second half of the Elections Clause states
that "Congress may at any time make or alter such
Regulations." 14 1 This power has been described by the Court as
"broad"142 and "comprehensive,"143 "embrac[ing] authority to
provide a complete code for congressional elections," 14 4 and able
to be "exercised at any time, and to any extent which [Congress]
deems expedient."1 4 5 Congress could use the power to refashion
federal policy on redistricting (or any other electoral matter) at
its discretion. It could permit (or even mandate) the adoption of
congressional redistricting commissions irrespective of the
preferences of state legislatures.
In fact, a victory for the Arizona legislature could increase
the odds of aggressive congressional intervention. At present,
most redistricting reform activity occurs in the states, both
because this is where most past successes have arisen and
because an array of veto points typically thwart federal action.
But if it became impossible to combat gerrymandering at the
state level, pressure for Congress to address the problem likely
would mount. Reformers likely would shift their efforts from
state capitals to Washington, because only Washington would be
able to provide an effective response. Notably, every other
country that has adopted redistricting commissions for its
constituent subparts has done so through federal legislation.1 4 6
140 See NCSL REPORT, supra note 4, at 189-200. This list includes advisory, backup,
bipartisan, nonpartisan, and partisan commissions.
141 U.S. CONST., art. I, §4.
142 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013).
143 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
144 id.
15 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880).
146 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 780-86 (describing histories of redistricting
institutions in foreign countries).
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In the long run, a win for the Arizona legislature might make
this outcome more probable in America as well.
Given all the veto points at the federal level, though, the
long run seems long indeed. Even if the odds of a congressional
solution would rise with an adverse decision, they only would
shift from nearly nonexistent to very poor. It thus is impossible
to sugarcoat what the invalidation of the Arizona commission
would mean for federal elections. Eventually, things could turn
out all right-but until then, the institutions that should have
the least authority over electoral issues would see their
influence over them grow immeasurably. In the meantime, a
disaster from the perspective of process theory would unfold.1 47
VII. CONCLUSION
Richard Pildes famously has complained about the
"constitutionalization of democratic politics"-the tendency of
courts to invalidate electoral policies for formalist reasons, thus
overly limiting other actors' discretion in matters of democratic
design.148 A decision in favor of the Arizona legislature would fit
this pattern perfectly. An institution that abridges no individual
rights and threatens no democratic values would be rendered
unlawful simply because, semantically, it is something other
than a legislature. In fact, it is even worse than that. Not only
does a redistricting commission avoid abridging rights or
threatening values, it affirmatively promotes one of the most
vital goals of all of constitutional law: preventing insiders from
enacting laws that benefit them at the expense of the public at
large. One can only hope, then, that the Court will approach the
Arizona case from a standpoint other than mindless literalism.
It is bad enough to strike down policies that cause no great
harm. It is even more perverse to ban ones that ought to be
celebrated.
147 Not that congressional control over congressional elections is any picnic either. It
would be preferable if the Constitution entrusted electoral regulation to an independent
and unelected body, much as many foreign charters do. See generally Bruce Ackerman,
The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633 (2000).
148 Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics,








VARIABLES Plans Data) Data)
Commission -0.00167 -0.0102 -0.0630***
(0.00682) (0.0153) (0.0201)
Court -0.0101** -0.00298 -0.0144
(0.00497) (0.00862) (0.0114)
Divided
Government -0.00792* -0.0204** -0.0316**
(0.00412) (0.00942) (0.0124)
Constant 0.0538*** 0.0779*** 0.149***
(0.00250) (0.00452) (0.00596)
State Fixed
Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed
Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 736 462 462
R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.031
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<o.l
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